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Abstract—Hardware aliasing occurs when the same logical
address can access different physical memory locations. This
is a problem for software on some embedded systems and
more generally when hardware becomes faulty in irretrievable
locations, such as on a Mars Lander. We show how to work
around the hardware problem with software logic, compiling
code so it works on any platform with hardware aliasing with
hidden determinism. That is: (i) a copy of an address accesses the
same location, and (ii) repeating an address calculation exactly
will repeat the same access again. Stuck bits can mean that
even adding zero to an address can make a difference in that
environment so nothing but a systematic approach has a chance
of working. The technique is extended to generate aliasing as
well as compensate for it, in so-called chaotic compilation, and
a sketch proof is included to show it may produce object code
that is secure against discovery of the programmer’s intention.
A prototype compiler implementing the technology covers all of
ANSI C except longjmp/setjmp.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware aliasing describes “the situation where, due to either
a hardware design choice or a hardware failure, one or more of
the available address bits is not used in the memory selection
process.” [1] The effect used to be familiar to programmers
and users alike, as the ‘DLL hell’ that the old 16-bit versions
of Windows were prone to. Dynamic linked libraries (DLLs)
were problematic for many reasons, but one was that different
versions of the same library loaded at the same memory
address and all applications referenced the in-memory copy.
So if one application loaded one version of the library then
another loaded another version, the first application would
unpredictably, as far as the program and user were concerned,
find itself in the second library’s code.
DOS users truly experienced the situation in the raw, as the
ubiquitous expanded memory managers (for memory beyond
1MB) such as QuarterDeck’s QEMM [2] remapped memory
so the video graphics (VGA) and bootstrap (BIOS) code
shared addresses with random access memory (RAM). What
a program accessed at runtime at a given address depended on
the memory manager heuristics. In consequence, code had to
use standard sequences to trigger expanded memory reliably.
Nowadays, processors such as the Raspberry PI-2 (all models)
[3] still dynamically share up to 1GB of RAM for general-
purpose use with the graphics processing unit (GPU).
Whatever the physical rationale, the symptom is the same
in every case. It is that what looks to programs to be the same
memory address (the logical address) sporadically accesses
physically different resources. Since the memory management
hardware in modern processors maps all input/output (I/O)
into one monolithic processor address space, that may mean
different regions of RAM or it may mean different peripheral
devices such as USB (‘universal serial bus’) and GPU.
Certainly, modern applications programmers are more fa-
miliar with software aliasing, in which the same physical re-
source – memory location or peripheral device – is accessible
via different logical addresses. But hardware aliasing has not
gone away so much as become less relevant for the ordinary
programmer as platforms have evolved to present a normalised
view to software. The paradigm of platform hardware that ac-
tually has hardware aliasing through and through but presents
‘normally’ to even a systems programmer is oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [4], [5], [6]. That is a secure RAM solution (available
in various forms since the 90s) in which internally the memory
contents are continuously randomly aliased and re-aliased to
frustrate cold boot attacks [7] (freezing the RAM sticks to
make the electrical charge last longer for analysis; RAM chips
require a read-and-rewrite cycle to maintain their contents and
ordinarily taking them out of the processor would lose the
contents immediately). But the closer the programmer works
to hardware the less complete may be the facade. On platforms
which are both resource-limited and relatively inaccessible,
programmers have to work around not only hardware that
shares the same address space but faults that can exacerbate
the situation. A stuck bit may take one address line out of
commission, forcing the hardware map into a smaller shared
address space. Or a Mars Lander may suffer a cosmic ray
through the processor that causes the arithmetic logic circuit
to compute 1+1 = 3. One way to cope with that is to rewrite
programs to treat 2 and 3 as indistinguishable for the purposes
of arithmetic. That means rewriting to work in arithmetic
modulo a suitable equivalence. That may be, for example here,
a partition of the number space into pairs {2, 3}, {4, 5}, etc., in
which {2m, 2m+1}+{2n, 2n+1} = {2(m+n), 2(m+n)+1}
and {2m, 2m+ 1} ∗ {2n, 2n+ 1} = {2mn, 2mn+ 1}. That
equivalence should in general be the least indiscriminatory that
makes the processor’s faulty answers x+y into a homomorphic
image of standard computer arithmetic.1 That entails losing
one arithmetic bit or more, since the only homomorphic
1 The simplest construction of a suitable equivalence is to set the processor’s
wrong result 1+1 = 3 equivalent to the correct result 1+1 = 2, with 2 ≡ 3,
and then close under the implications x1 ≡ x2 ∧ y1 ≡ y2 → x1 + y1 ≡
x2 + y2, where the + is the correct one. Similarly for multiplication, etc.
The equivalence shown is x ≡ y iff ⌊x/2⌋ = ⌊y/2⌋, with 2 ≡ 3.
images have sizes that are factors of the original size 2n, which
will be 2m for some m < n.
While 4 and 5 may denote the same value arithmetically,
as addresses they access different memory locations and a
program rewritten to accommodate a nontrivial arithmetic
equivalence will experience hardware aliasing. So the cure for
the computational mathematics engenders a need to handle the
consequential aliasing. Since low-level programs in particular
use pointers heavily, there is no room for an ad hoc approach
to that. Even high-level programming languages use pointers
nearly ubiquitously – every object in Java is really a pointer, so
copying an object requires the clone() system call. A simple
copy will just be another pointer to the same object. Every
variable in Fortran95 is a pointer – a subroutine call f(x) alters
the value of its callers variable x when the subroutine writes
to x. Arrays in C are passed as pointers too. Not only will
the system-level programmers need a reliable way to program
around hardware aliasing because systems programming is
hard enough without new traps for the unwary, but application-
level programmers, the mathematicians and control engineers,
must be able to remain comfortably ignorant of the hazard.
It turns out that there is a systematic way of generating
code that always works in a hardware aliasing environment
– a compiler mechanism – and this paper sets it out. There
has been no other work on this topic since the present authors
made an original suggestion as to what to do in 2014 [8],
but experience has shown that suggestion to be too delicate
for practice (the idea was to set up different type classes for
arrays – in one, array entries are uniquely accessed by walking
a pointer in unit increments up from the bottom of the array,
in another, access is uniquely by walking down from the top,
in another, access is uniquely via a single constant offset from
the bottom of the array, and so on; each class enforces a unique
calculation for each array entry which produces the same
result each time, as discussed below, but the programmer must
choose what type to declare each array as and there is no proof
that deeply nested arrays of pointers to arrays of pointers,
etc., will not give rise to inconsistencies). The technology
reported in this paper is less efficient computationally but it
is robust and usable in practice by programmers, and it has
been deployed and tested – c.f. the HAVOC compiler suite for
ANSI C [9] at http://sf.net/p/obfusc. The programmer is aware
only that they need to declare each pointer with a restrict
modifier. That nominates a top-level (or local) memory zone
that the pointer is to range through. Not declaring a zone
means the compiler assumes the pointer can point anywhere
at runtime, which causes prohibitively large object code to be
generated – gigabytes for a line of source code – so it behoves
the programmer to declare a small zone.
The solution works because of an underlying determinism in
processors. Processors are mechanisms that are both designed
to produce repeatable results and also do so inherently because
of their material. They are quite high power electronic logic
circuits, which makes it rare for a faulty bit to be really
random. Even if the electrical value is floating then that
will give one determined value when tested electrically in a
determined way – in a semiconductor circuit the test is always
either if the bit can supply current to ground or to the positive
rail and the answer for a floating line is ‘no’ both ways. The
logic circuit has been damaged so that it is different from the
way it was designed but it is still a logic circuit which responds
to given inputs with given outputs, in this hypothetical case
producing a floating bit in some conditions. The functionality
depends on the circuit around the damaged area and it may be
more complicated input to output than always on or always
off, but it should be deterministic.
The situation may be encapsulated as hidden deterministic
hardware aliasing, axiomatised as follows with respect to the
addresses produced by sequences of processor operations:
Axioms
1. A machine code copy instruction copies the physical bit
sequence exactly, such that a copied address accesses the
same memory location as the original;
2. repeating the same sequence of operations produces an
address that physically has exactly the same bit sequence
and accesses the same location;
3. logically different addresses always have physically dif-
ferent bit sequences.
By ‘logically different’ is meant different in terms of the
intended arithmetic. In the example, 4 and 5 are not logically
different as they are equivalent in the equivalence relation with
respect to which arithmetic is well-defined, with 4 ≡ 5, but
5 and 6 are logically different and 5 6≡ 6 in the equivalence
relation. The 4 and 5 can be thought of as different physical
encodings of the same logical number (here, 2), while 5 and 6
are different physical encodings of different logical numbers.
Axiom 1 (‘faithful copy’) implies a compiler can generate
code that copies an address for later use after writing through
it, and the copy can be trusted to retrieve the written value.
The address must not be altered, not even by adding zero, as
any arithmetic calculation at all potentially alters the physical
representation of the address as a sequence of bits, which
then fails to access the same memory location. In the example
given, 0 is equivalent to 1, so adding what is arithmetically
zero may in fact mean adding one in physical terms.
Axiom 2 (‘repeatability’) allows for some calculations on
addresses, so long as they are repeated exactly each time. That
is useful because machine code instructions to read or write a
memory location generally take a base address a in a register
and adds a displacement d embedded in the instruction to get
effective address a+d for the access. It is impossible to avoid
the processor doing that one addition, but it does not matter
because the same calculation is repeated at each access, with
physically the same sequence of bits resulting.
Axiom 3 (‘no confusion’) guarantees that the represen-
tations as physical sequences of bits of what are logically
different addresses do not step on each other. The addresses
with bit sequences 5 and 6 in the example represent logically
different numbers (logically 2 and 3 respectively).
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section II explains
how to compile to obtain code ‘safe against hardware-aliasing’
in the most general context. The generated code has to cope
with variations in the addresses produced, while they are
actually governed by a ‘hidden determinism’, as described
above. Section III details an extension in which variations
are deliberately introduced by the compiler (which can cope
them) to the maximal extent possible. That has significance
for ‘obfuscation’ in the object code produced. The section
finishes with an argument that unrolling code to a length that is
exponential (super-polynomial) in the number of bits per word
and then compiling it with variations ‘to the maximal extent
possible’ as described in the section results in safety against
polynomial complexity attacks aimed at determining what the
data in the runtime trace means. The technique introduced in
Section II can be seen as coping with apparently unreliable
addressing (that is really deterministically generated but in an
unknown way) and the technique of Section III extends that
to generate apparent unreliability in data in general, as well
as cope with it.
II. SAFE COMPILATION FOR HARDWARE ALIASING
The working principle for generating viable code in this kind
of environment is that each address that is written should
be saved for later read, as per Axiom 1 (‘faithful copy’)
of Section I. The problem is that it is saved at an address,
which must also be saved, and so on recursively. Axiom 2
(‘repeatability’) allows a backstop to be put on the recursion,
via base addresses that are produced at compile time and a
repeated calculation at runtime based on them. But no finite set
of addresses can suffice for nested function calls to unbounded
depth, so the runtime stack must be involved. The first problem
is how to manipulate the stack pointer so addresses and other
data might be saved and recovered reliably from stack.
A. Stack Pointer 101
The standard compiler-generated function call sequence decre-
ments the stack pointer register sp by the amount that will be
needed for local storage in the function immediately on entry
to the function body, and increments it again before exit:
call to function
. . .
function code start:
decrement sp
. . .
increment sp
return
(1)
That does not work in a hardware aliasing environment,
because the increment does not necessarily restore exactly the
same physical representation originally in the stack pointer
register. Instead, the caller gets back a possibly different set
of bits that, however, means the same thing arithmetically.
Being different, it references a different location in memory.
The frame pointer register fp must be co-opted to copy the
stack pointer, and copy the stack pointer back from it just
before return from the call:
function code start:
copy sp to fp
decrement sp
. . .
copy fp to sp
return
(2)
That is the standard unoptimised function call sequence from a
compiler but optimisation will replace it with the fp-less code
(1). The GNU gcc compiler (for example) with -fno-omit-
frame-pointer on the command line turns off optimisation and
produces the code (2), which works with hardware aliasing.
It is not perfect, however, because the caller’s frame pointer
register must also be saved and restored by the callee around
its own use of the frame pointer register, as follows:
function code start:
save old fp to 1 below sp
copy sp to fp
decrement sp
. . .
copy fp to sp
restore old fp from 1 below sp
return
(3)
Saving below the caller’s stack pointer would ordinarily in-
trude on the callee’s stack area (‘frame’), so the decrement
must be larger by one in order to leave room for it. As many
as the compiler wants of the caller’s registers can be saved
like this. The application binary interface (ABI) document for
the platform specifies which registers the callee must save,
and which the caller code must expect may be trampled on
and must save itself. The frame pointer and stack pointer are
callee-saved in (3).
The function call code (3) works well with hardware alias-
ing. It allows local variables for the function to be reliably
addressed as sp+d on the stack, where d is a displacement
between 0 and the function frame size. The d is supplied as an
embedded constant in a load or store machine code instruction
(see below in (4-5)) that references the stack pointer register,
containing sp, as the base for the displacement. The processor
calculates sp+d for the effective address passed to memory.
B. Variables
With the function call sequence in (3), accessing local vari-
ables is simple. A word-sized local variable x is assigned
a position n on the stack and the compiler issues a load
instruction (lw) to read from there to register r:
lw r n(sp) # load from offset n from sp (4)
The processor calculates sp+d but repeats the same calcula-
tion at every access, so by Axiom 2 of Section I the same
sequence of bits for the address is produced every time, and
it accesses the same spot in memory. To write the variable, a
store instruction (sw) replaces the load instruction:
sw n(sp) r # store to offset n from sp (5)
For a global variable at an address a in (heap) memory, the
compiler offsets from the zero register zer instead:
lw r a(zer) # load from address a (6)
The zero register contains a fixed base value. The effective
address sent to memory is a+0, which is possibly a physically
different sequence of bits to a (representing the same value),
but the calculation is repeated exactly each time so the same
memory location is accessed each time.
Variables in the parent’s frame may also be accessed. If
the function is defined within another function, we shall call
it an interior function (‘nested’ is the standard term, but it
risks confusion with ‘nested’ function calls – one function
called from another). The compiler arranges that the exterior
function’s frame pointer is handed down at runtime in the c9
register (it is c9 in our own platform’s ABI; it may be different
in other ABIs) and that is preserved through successive interior
function calls. Then a load or store instruction using c9 instead
of sp or zer reliably accesses the exterior function’s variables
on the stack.
C. Arrays
Arrays present the real difficulties as entries are fundamentally
always accessed by address and addressing is fundamentally
unreliable in a hardware aliasing environment.
There are (at least) two common but different ways of
addressing the entries in an array a. That is (a) via a load
or store instruction with fixed displacement n from the array
address a (that is ‘a[n]’), or (b) via a pointer with value p
that ranges through the array starting at a and steps through
the elements until the desired one is reached, at which point a
load or store instruction with displacement 0 from the pointer
(‘p[0]’) is applied. Those two modes were considered in our
earlier work [8], which continues to be the only work we
know of on how to even possibly get around hardware aliasing.
The two calculations (a) and (b) for the effective address are
respectively a+n and a+1+ 1 · · ·+1+ 0. The calculations
may produce physically different sequences of bits to be sent
to memory, so the two are mutually incompatible and one or
the other must be used all the time for consistency. But both
have proven too restrictive in practice. It is as common, for
example, for real code to step a pointer down through an array
as to step up through it, and the transformation the compiler
needs to do results in prohibitively inefficient code at runtime.
Evidently also, there are many other ways of addressing array
entries commonly encountered in source code and we cannot
be expected to cater for them all.
We have accepted instead an engineering compromise in
which array access is not for general-purpose use going to
be constant time. For special purposes, one of the addressing
modes (a) and (b) may be used, but that would be liable to
cause programming mistakes at application-level. For arrays
of size N it turns out the compiler can provide access in
logN time in a simple manner that is safe and reliable for all
methods of calculating an index or pointer, known or unknown.
Linear complexity code will be presented first. To read
(local) array element a[n] the code tests n against each of
0, . . . , N−1 in turn and chooses one address for each entry:
(n == 0)?a[0]:
(n == 1)?a[1]:
...
(7)
The equality tests are arithmetic and are therefore insensitive
to the physical representation of the value n of n as possibly
physically different sequences of bits. The generated machine
code always passes effective address a+ d to memory where
d is the displacement from the base of the array for the entry
and a is the address sp + k, where k is the position on the
stack allocated by the compiler for the lowest array element
a[0]. The code is just the one machine instruction:
lw r d(r) # load from address a+d
# with a in r to r
(8)
The address a is supplied by a preceding instruction:
addi r sp k # add k to sp in r
lw r d(r) # load from address a+d
(9)
That produces the same calculation sp+k for a every time.
Improving this code to logN complexity means using a
binary tree instead of linear lookup for the value n of n,
deciding first if n is below N/2 or above it, then on what side
of N/4 or 3N/4 it is, and so on. Code for writing instead of
reading follows the same pattern, with store instead of load
instructions at the leaves of the binary tree or linear sequence.
The same form works for pointer p accesses, provided the
compiler knows what zone of memory it points into. We have
tightened the type system of C (the source language for our
prototype compiler) so the pointer is declared with the name
of a (possibly over-large) array a into which the programmer
guarantees it points at runtime:
int *p restrict a (10)
That selects array a as the target zone for p.
Some porting has to be done for existing code, marking out
areas into which different pointers point. It generally turns out
to mean declaring a global array from which objects of the
kind pointed to are allocated from, or declaring one function
as interior to another function (for example, main) where the
target zone of the pointer is declared as local on the stack.
A restrict pointer type is narrower than it would otherwise
be but there are no no semantic changes to the language
so the programmer does not have to relearn anything. The
programmer does (usually) have to make changes, but the new
code is valid in unmodified C, so it can be checked. Ideally it
is obtained via a sequence of careful code transformations. The
conservative choice is usually to replace ad-hoc declarations
with calls to an object factory for each compound type.
The following code is suitable for lookup via pointer p:
(p == a+0)?a[0]:
(p == a+1)?a[1]:
...
(11)
It is insensitive to the way the pointer p is calculated because
the equality tests are arithmetic and are not derailed by the
aliasing in memory addressing. A selection a[d] is made, and
the same lookup code (8) for a[d] is executed each time, giving
the same result.
This code can (also) be made logN complexity with a
binary tree structure. It can be converted for write by replacing
load instructions at the leaves with store instructions.
These constructions make pointer-based addressing consis-
tent with access via an array index in the hardware aliasing
context. The idea is to make the choice of address arithmeti-
cally, and then reuse that same address or calculation for the
address again and again.
If the number N of array elements is determined at runtime
(the C ’99 standard adds so-called variable length arrays),
then a ‘late binding’ code pattern is needed instead. The
following generated code generalises (11) to read reliably
through pointer p for a number N of elements that is a local
variable at runtime:
for (int d=0; d<N; d++)
if (p == a+d) {return a[d];} (12)
The effective address passed to memory is sp+ k+ (0 + 1+
· · · + 1) + 0, where a = sp + k is the address of array a,
and the 1s are repeated d times to address the dth element of
the array. This is not the same calculation as in (11) so it is
not generally compatible with that in this kind of environment.
The compiler must always generate either the form (11) or the
form (12). If there are no dynamically sized arrays in the code
then it can afford to use (11) (the generated code is longer but
conceptually simpler). If there are dynamically sized arrays
then it must use the form (12). Tighter distinctions may be
possible, but we have not explored them.
The same form must be used for indexed read:
for (int d=0; d<N; d++)
if (n == d) {return a[d];} (13)
The calculation for the effective address passed to memory is
the same as in (12). Both (12-13) can be modified for logN
complexity, and then the modified form must be used always.
Writes replace the ‘a[d]’ return (translated to a load machine
code instruction by the compiler) with a ‘a[d] = x’ (translated
to a store machine code instruction).
D. Data Types
We will not unduly belabour the topic here, but compound (and
short) data types need special consideration, at least because
compound data may contain arrays and arrays need special
consideration (above). Indeed, a common programming style
in C is to access the members of a compound data type as
though the whole were an array of words, and to access the
members via a pointer to word. Unless debugging memory
pointer problems is a favourite pastime, the programmer wants
the compiler to get both modes of access (conventional and
as an array of words) right.
The trick for the compiler is to always treat records with
named fields (‘struct’ in C) as word arrays and translate the
field name to an array displacement. The declaration
struct { int a; int b; } x (14)
declares x with two named fields, a and b, each one word
wide. It occupies two words on the stack at displacements k
and k′ (the value k+1) respectively from the stack pointer.
The compiler generates accesses to the fields x.a and x.b just
as it would for any local variables situated there, by calling
lw r k(sp) # load from x.a (15)
to read from x.a, for example. The effective address passed to
memory is sp+k. To access x.b, the address passed is sp+k′
instead. The compiler generates the code for array access
explained in the section above, and source code that accesses
the fields of the struct as though it were an array works too.
Long atomic types such as double are also treated as arrays
of words by the compiler. But most platforms have double-
word load and store instructions that will fetch/write two
words at once:
ld r k(sp) # double word load (16)
and only the address of the first word is given to the instruc-
tion. Registers are indexed as pairs for this instruction, and
the partner to r is loaded up by the instruction with the word
at address k+1.
But that is not necessarily compatible with treating the dou-
ble as a two-word array in a hardware aliasing environment. If
the double is on the stack then the effective address for the first
word is sp+k, say. The processor may request a double-word
from memory at that address. Or it may request two words, one
at sp+k and one at (sp+k)+1. Both address calculations are
reliably repeatable, according to the axioms of Section I, but
by those axioms there is no guarantee that the latter calculation
accesses the word at one beyond sp+k in memory. Indeed, the
example given in that section shows that if sp+k gives one
of the answers {4, 5}, then the arithmetic must be so arranged
that (sp+k)+1 gives one of the answers {6, 7}. It may be that
4 is produced for the former, and 6 for the latter, and those
are not consecutive positions in memory.
Overall, it is safer that the compiler not make use of double
word instructions, though if the program contains no accesses
to doubles as two-word arrays, then it is perfectly safe.
The difficulty remarked above with double transfers to
accessing the individual bytes of a single word too. It is
safer overall not to use the byte-oriented instructions that the
platform provides, but to use arithmetic instead, as follows.
For index-oriented access to the characters of a string a, the
compiler generates code that splits the character index i into
index d for a word consisting of a sequence of 4 characters,
and offset j for the wanted character within the word:
d = i/4;
j = i%4;
(17)
Then the character is obtained via an array-of-words lookup
and the following arithmetic for the jth char of the dth word:
(a[d] / 256
j
) % 256 (18)
In our own prototype compiler, we have preferred to avoid the
complication and pack characters only one to a word, at the
cost of an inefficient use of memory.
III. DELIBERATELY CHAOTIC COMPILATION
We can take the general scheme for compiling around hard-
ware aliasing on the platform and use it to work around
variations introduced by the compiler itself. The point is that
varying the object code tends to obscure what it does, and
obfuscation is a legitimate aim of some fields of software
engineering. Many companies might like to distribute object
code that is so obfuscated that it cannot be reverse engineered,
while not being hampered in execution (of course it is easy to
produce code that theoretically cannot be reverse engineered
– it suffices to include a loop that in parallel to everything
else that the program does, searches at low priority for an
inconsistency proof for integer arithmetic, and if it finds one,
interrupts the rest of the program, and nobody can say for
certain if the program will complete normally or not – but in
practice a skilled engineer can make a good job of it).
The aim in chaotic compilation is to compile the same
source code differently each time, forming object codes that
have the same overall functionality but the runtime traces vary
to the maximal extent possible within these constraints:
1) The same sequence of machine code instructions exe-
cutes, in the same order.
2) The constants embedded in each machine code instruction
differ to the maximal extent possible.
3) The data written to registers and memory differs to the
maximal extent possible.
The idea is to compile program p1 and prepare data d1 for it,
and to compile program p2 and prepare data d2 for it. The two
data sets represent the same thing, but their presentation for the
two compiled programs differs. Then p1(d1) and p2(d2) are
run. Comparing the two runtime traces, the characteristics 1)-
3) above are seen. The ‘differs to the maximal extent possible’
refers to the stochastic distribution of outcomes. Compilation
is randomised, so each runtime trace is one of a range of
possible traces, and the ideal is that each trace is exactly
as frequent an outcome as any other among the possibilities.
That is a ‘flat’ distribution of outcomes, which is a maximal
entropy2 distribution in information theoretic terms. That is,
no bias or other tendency is discernible. Even though human
programmers naturally tend to use low numbers like 0 and 1,
the compiler will have randomised the object code so that
tendency, and any other, is not present. So ‘differs to the
maximal extent possible’ means a flat probability distribution
of the stated observations, which is technically chaotic.
‘Getting the intended result’ would be a fourth constraint,
but it is already said that the overall functionality is retained.
It will be argued that chaotic compilation may be applied
to any program such that on a platform with a n-bit word:
The runtime trace cannot be read correctly with prob-
ability above chance by a polynomial time method
(O)
in n as n → ∞, in the (hypothetical) situation that the
2The entropy of a distribution of random events X is formally the
expectation E[− log
2
prob(X)]. Informally, it captures the number of 1/0
degrees of freedom (‘bits’). Entropy of 1 bit equates to two equally probable
possibilities X .
hardware word size can be varied. That is, the probability p
of getting right what it is intended by the programmer for any
chosen data bit in the trace to mean tends to 1/2 as n→∞.
In the simple case of a program with no code, for example,
the compiler produces no machine code for both programs p1
and p2 above. The prepared data d1 and d2 still differ, however.
For example, in d1 the author may write 3 where they really
mean 7, but in d2 they may write 15 where they really mean
7, and so on. The author can still read the output (which is the
same as the input) because they know the substitution. But an
onlooker cannot tell what they really meant. There is no bias in
the observations if the presentation scheme for the input data
(which is the same as the output) is randomly chosen (this is a
fundamental result of information theory – the entropy in two
n-bit signals added together cannot be less than the entropy of
either, so when one has maximal entropy, the combined signal
also has maximal entropy, which means a flat distribution).
The more remarkable part is that the reasoning works for
any program. We will show how the compiler may vary
A. addresses (Subsection III-A below);
B. data content (Subsection III-B)
randomly so traces ‘differ to the maximal extent possible’ at
runtime between compilation and recompilation, elaborating
the technique of Section II to induce variation as well as cope
with it, concluding with a sketch of the argument for (O).
A. Address Displacement Constants
Instead of generating a load instruction to read from a variable
at position n on the stack like this (8):
lw r n(sp) # load r from offset n from sp
the compiler will issue the instruction with a displacement
constant ∆ different from n:
lw r ∆(s) # load from offset n from sp (19)
∆ is randomly chosen and the register s has been pre-set to
contain sp + n − ∆, where sp is the nominal value of the
stack pointer. The bit sequence passed to memory by (19) as
effective address to read from is the result of the calculation:
sp + n−∆+∆ (20)
The compiler always emits the same instruction sequence,
getting the same address always as result, but it has to ensure
that the ∆ used in place of the n is the same each time, for
each n. So it maintains a vector ∆ indexed by stack location
n. (a similar vector ∆Z is maintained for the heap). Then the
∆ in (19) is really ∆ = ∆n and the instruction in (19) is:
lw r ∆n(s) # load from offset n from sp (21)
The vector∆ is changed randomly by the compiler as it works
through the source code and is a source of extra variation, but
as explained above it seems not to do anything because the
base address read from register s is asserted in (20) to be
offset to compensate. That is not true. The compiler controls
the offset in register s too, as explained below, so that random
variations from nominal in every register and memory location
are produced and accounted for. The essence is that:
Each machine code instruction that writes is freely
varied to the maximum extent possible.
(h)
For example, the load instruction of (21) has one embedded
constant ∆n and it is freely varied by the compiler. The
instruction is exceptional, however, in that it writes, but not in
any way that is controlled by the varied constant. The result
always ends up in the named register r. Instead ‘writes’ must
be understood as ‘having an observable effect on the trace’.
B. Content Deltas
As remarked above, the stack pointer sp does not contain the
value sp that it notionally should have but instead is offset
from that by a randomly generated value δ. That is true of
the content of every register and memory location at every
point in the generated code. The compiler maintains a vector
ð of the offset delta for content in each register and memory
location, varying it as it passes through the code, and the δ
for the stack pointer register is δ = ð sp.
We need to work through enough detail of what the compiler
does to show the principle (h) is satisfied, but most will be
omitted. The following is an abstract, declarative rendering
of what the compiler does to translate a non-side-effecting
expression e of the source language, which is the simplest
part of its work.
Let the compiler be Cr[−], translating e to machine code
mc that targets the result for register r at runtime. That is:
(mc, ð) = Cr[e] (22)
Let the state of the runtime machine before mc runs be σ0, let
the nominal value for the expression3 be [e]σ0 , then running
code mc takes state σ0 to state σ1 in which the value in register
r is offset from the nominal value by the randomly generated
amount ðr. That is:
σ0
mc
 σ1 where σ1(r) = [e]
σ0 + ðr (23)
Re-rendering the code in (21) to read the nth location on the
stack and show explicitly the previous instruction that preps
the base address (in register r) for the load:
addi r sp k # k = n− ð sp−∆n
lw r ∆n(r) # read nth stack location
(24)
The memory receives as effective address to read from the
result of the following calculation:
sp + ð sp+ k +∆n where k = n− ð sp−∆n (25)
The stack pointer register sp contains the nominal value
sp offset by ð sp. Summing, the address has the arithmetic
value sp+n. The physical representation as a sequence of
bits may both be different from nominal and may vary, as
3 The ‘nominal value’ [e]σ of expression e is is formalisable via a canonical
construction: map a variable x in the expression to its register location rx
(the runtime value is offset by a delta ðrx), checking the content of rx in the
state and discounting the delta to get [x]σ = σ(rx)− ðrx. Arithmetic in the
expression is formalised recursively, with [e1 + e2]σ = [e1]σ + [e2]σ , etc.
discussed in Section I: one might equally get a 4 as a 5 from
the calculation, following the example there. However, the
calculation is the same every time so the bit sequence passed
to memory is the same every time, by Axiom 2. It cannot
hit the memory location associated with any other (logical)
address by Axiom 3, and the calculation for the address (25)
is repeated exactly at every access via (24) so it hits just one
memory location of those feasible for the logical address.
The ð and ∆ values are changed by the compiler at (just
before) every point in the code where a write occurs. After
the write the deltas for that location have to be maintained
constant through the following sequences of reads from the
same location along the code paths through that point, or the
reads would miss. There are two instructions generated in (24)
and both carry constants that can be varied by the compiler.
However, the constraint on the right in (24) binds them and
restricts the total variation possible. A further variation beyond
that constraint would to vary the logical position n of the target
on the stack at every write to it. That can be done but it is too
tricky to describe here, so we will hypothesise that the position
on the stack forms part of the intended program semantics and
it cannot be varied.
Within that constraint, the two instructions in (24) can be
varied maximally by the compiler, as required by (h). It is
just that, by virtue of the constraint, the entropy the compiler
can introduce to the runtime trace via them is not 2× 32 bits
(assuming a 32-bit word), but only 1× 32 bits. That is, if
the ∆n constant in the load instruction is freely chosen by
the compiler, then the k constant in the preceding addition is
determined by k = n − ð sp −∆n, and if the k constant is
freely chosen then the ∆n value is determined.
Closely related work presently under review [10] makes the
above observations precise:
Theorem 1. The entropy in a trace over recompilations is
the sum of the entropies of every instruction that writes that
appears in it, counted once each.
The entropy of the two instructions combined in (24) is 32
bits (on a 32-bit platform). That can be seen as 32 bits for
the first instruction, and zero for the second, as its variation
is already determined once the first has been seen.
The compiler’s job in the chaotic compilation context is to
do everything it can to maximise entropy in the trace. It turns
out that following (h) as a compiler design principle does that,
which is why we have been careful to check for it above:
Theorem 2. The trace entropy is maximised when the com-
piler varies every instruction that writes to the maximal extent
possible from recompilation to recompilation.
Successfully varying each instruction to the maximal extent
possible provides a stochastic setting at runtime in which an
observer cannot be sure what the numerical value of the data in
the trace is really intended to mean even in terms of a statistical
tendency, because the maximum 32 bits (on a 32-bit platform)
of information caused to be written by the programmer at each
point in the trace is swamped by that much contribution again
from the compiler. But there are limits on what the compiler
can do in terms of variation, as argued for (24) above.
But the constraint for (24) can be removed via a modifica-
tion to the underlying platform. The idea is to allow potentially
any address to stand for ‘the nth location on the stack’. That
requires an extra hardware or software address translation unit
between the runtime software process and memory. On being
passed a new address a intended as the nth stack position, it
remaps it to the next free address b in a previously designated
contiguous linear region of memory R, say the region between
1GB and 1.25GB, and memoizes the choice so the next time
the address a is passed to it, it is mapped to b in R again. That
gives each process access to 250MB, though the addresses a
it generates range randomly across the full 32-bit range (0 to
4GB). The compiler inserts instructions in the object code that
remove defunct mappings, keeping the memory needed down.
That unit exists and is part of every processor. It is the
‘translation lookaside buffer’ (TLB), and its job is to remap
memory address space a page (8KB) at a time, but we need it
to work with individual addresses, not whole pages. An easy
solution is to simulate it in an underlying software layer. Given
that, the compiler is free to vary n in (24) and the constraint
in (25) relates three constants, k, n and ∆n, allowing for 2×
32 bits of entropy for the two ‘instructions that write’ in (24),
satisfying (h) and allowing Theorem 2 to conclude the trace
has been randomised (‘trace entropy is maximised’).
But there are still other constraints on compiler-induced
variation due to computational semantics. The inputs and
outputs of a copy instruction are the same, so the variations
in them are the same and not independent. Also, the compiler
must set the same variations from nominal values at the end
of a loop as at the beginning, because it cannot tell in general
how many times a loop will be traversed at runtime and must
prepare the code for another traversal after one time through.
We will not go through all the code constructs, just loops,
to show how and when the principle (h) must sometimes fail.
C. Loops
Let the statement compiler C[−] produce code mc from
statement s of the source language, changing the combined
database D = (∆, ð) of offsets to Ds in the process. The
offsets ð are the intended variations from nominal values at
runtime for the data content of each register and memory
location and the offsets ∆ are the extra displacements for
addressing described in Section III-A.
For legibility, pairs (D, x) will be written D : x here. Then
the statement above of what the compiler does with statements
s is formalised as:
Ds : mc = C[D : s] (26)
The notation emphasises the compiler is side-effecting on D.
Compiling while e s means emitting code mc constructed
from mce for e and mcs for s, with this shape:
start: mce # compute e in r
beqz r end # goto to end if r zero
mcs # compute s
b start # goto start
end:
(27)
That does not work as-is, because the code does not at the end
of the loop reestablish the deltas that prevailed at loop start,
so a second time through at runtime, much goes wrong. Extra
code is needed after mcs, so-called ‘trailer’ instructions.
A trailer instruction adjusts the content of register r back to
the delta ðr off nominal at the beginning of the loop, starting
from a delta ðsr at the end of the loop. It is as follows:
addi r r k # where k = ð r − ðs r (28)
Just the one instruction is required per register.
Trailer instructions that restore the nth stack location offset
must also restore the address displacement constant used in
load and store. That is a more complex code sequence:
addi t0 sp j # j = n− ð sp−∆sn
lw t0∆sn(t0) # load nth stack location
addi t0 t0 k # modify by k = ðn− ðsn
addi t1 sp l # l = n− ð sp−∆n
sw∆n(t1) t0 # store nth stack location
(29)
(the t0, t1 registers are ‘temporary’ workspace). The first two
instructions are the read stack code of (24), and the last two
are the corresponding write code. In-between, the instruction
(28) changes the content delta. The sequence reads with one
address displacement, and writes with another, changing the
location of the (changed) content.
The trailer sequences (28-29) introduce no entropy at all
into the runtime trace and therefore fail the principle (h)
(effectively, per instruction that writes, 32 bits of variation is
needed from the compiler to mask programmer information).
The constants in the instructions are determined by choices
of deltas by the compiler for earlier instructions and it is
impossible to execute the trailer instructions without traversing
the loop body, which will execute those earlier instructions, so
these trailer instructions are always ‘old news’ when they run.
The content of the registers or memory locations they affect
during execution is correlated with the content of registers and
memory locations at the start of the loop.
Other places where the compiler must put trailer instructions
like (28-29) are where conditional branches join again, the
labelled targets of gotos, and at return from functions. Calls
of interior functions also require ‘trailers’, but before the
call, because the delta offsets in force at the point where the
function was defined must be reestablished (that is a ‘come
from’ semantics; c.f. goto). If there are any global variables,
then the same holds of ordinary (i.e., not ‘interior’) function
calls, with respect to the global variables they access.
At each of those points the principle (h) fails, because every
instruction that writes (on a 32-bit platform) does not introduce
32 bits of entropy from the compiler.
D. The Argument for (O)
Given the analysis above, the argument for (O) requires a
program to be unrolled far enough before chaotic compilation
so none of the points where (h) fails will be encountered in
practice by an observer. Then by Theorem 1 the entropy in the
observed part of the trace is sufficient to mask completely any
input from the programmer, and an observer cannot say with
any significant probability of being right (as the word length
n tends to infinity) what any bit of data picked out of the trace
means. A fuller sketch of the argument is as follows:
Proof: [Sketch for (O)] Suppose for contradiction that the
observer has a polynomial time method f(n, T ) of working
out what the data beneath the encryption is at some m points
of interest in the trace T of program P , where n is the platform
word size. For brevity assume P includes its intended inputs,
compiled-in. The observer sees runtime trace T .
WLOG take m=1 and suppose the observer is interested in
only one particular bit in that particular register or location
in memory at that point, say the least significant bit b. It
is last written to in the M th step of the trace before the
point of interest. Then the observer’s prediction f(n, T ) is
0 or 1. Suppose also the program has been written in the
machine code subset consisting of addition instructions with
semantics x← y+k (addix y k) for a constant k embedded
in the instruction, and branch instructions with semantics
if x<y+k gotoL (bltx y k L) for constant k and target ad-
dress L embedded in the instruction. (Those are enough for
computable functions, i.e., ‘programs’; c.f., the programming
language Fractran [11].)
A challenger readies a sequence of maximal entropy com-
pilations C[Pn] of P with the nth being for a n-bit platform
as target, and P having been partially or completely unrolled
as Pn with no loops or branches in the first 2
n (i.e., super-
polynomially many) machine code instructions. If the program
predictably ends before then, it is to be unrolled completely.
These are compilations of the same program P all with the
same end-to-end semantics that could be produced entirely
automatically (the constants in P can be expressed exactly in
the n bit words available on the platform, for all n considered).
The observer is invited to apply their method f and predict
the chosen bit b in the traces Tn. By hypothesis, f(n, Tn) is
correct with probability at least B with B > 1/2 as n→∞.
Let N be such that for n ≥ N the word of interest for
the observer in the trace is produced by the unrolled part,
that is, 2N ≥ M . Consider the program Q that is PN with
the instruction that produces the word of interest changed from
x← y+k to x← y+k′ where k′ = k+1, so the word is written
in Q to 1 more than in PN . But also all instructions in PN that
read that register or memory location x before it is written over
again are changed in Q to compensate. That is, an instruction
z←x+k1 in PN is changed to z←x+k
′
1 in Q, where k
′
1 =
k1−1; an instruction if x<z+k2 gotoL in PN is changed to
if x<z+k′2 gotoL in Q, where k
′
2 = k2−1. (There are only
a finite number of instructions to change, as PN is finite, but
they may appear infinitely many times in the trace.)
TABLE I
TRACE FOR ACKERMANN(3,1)
PC instruction trace updates
...
35 addi t0 a0 -86921031 t0 ← -86921028
36 addi t1 zer -327157853 t1 ← -327157853
37 beq t0 t1 2 240236822
38 addi t0 zer -1242455113 t0 ← -1242455113
39 b 1
41 addi t1 zer -1902505258 t1 ← -1902505258
42 xor t0 t0 t1 -1734761313 1242455113 1902505258
t0 = -17347613130
43 beqz t0 9 -1734761313
53 addi sp sp 800875856 sp ← 1687471183
54 addi t0 a1 -915514235 t0 ← -915514234
55 addi t1 zer -1175411995 t1 ← -1175411995
56 beq t0 t1 2 259897760
57 addi t0 zer 11161509 t0 ← 11161509
...
143 addi v0 t0 42611675 v0 ← 13 # result
...
147 jr ra
STOP
Legend
op. fields semantics register use
addi r0 r1 k r0 ← r1 + k a0,a1,. . . function argument
b i pc ← pc + i pc program counter
beq r1 r2 i ifr1=r2thenpc←pc+i ra return address
jr r pc ← r sp stack pointer
xor r0 r1 r2 r0 ← (r1+k1)̂ (r2+k2)−k0 t0,t1,. . . temporaries
k1 k2 k0 v0,v1,. . . return value
i program count increment, k instruction constant, r content of r
Then the trace of Q is the same as the trace of PN (and Pn,
for n ≥ N except for that one word and its least significant
bit. Moreover, the traces from the code C[Q] are each of them
traces that may have been produced from code C[PN ] (and/or
any Pn for n ≥ N ) since the change from PN to Q is one
that the compiler may make, i.e. Q = C[PN ] is possible.
Then the method f(n,−) applied to a trace of C[Q] on a
platform with an n bit word produces the same result as when
applied to a trace of C[PN ] (and C[Pn] for n ≥ N ), and so
must produce the right result for P with probability at least
B > 1/2 for n large enough. But that is the wrong result for
Q. So the method f(n,−) produces the right result for Q with
probability 1−B < 1/2 for large enough n, contradicting the
hypothesis, so the hypothetical method f does not exist.
The result for m≥1 follows because if the observer had a
method f that made predictions at m>1 points in the trace,
then the method g that throws away the m−1 predictions of
f ’s at unwanted points would work as a method for m=1, and
the proof rules that out. Similarly for more than one bit.
The argument is not deep, as the empty program case shows,
but it is hard to codify and should increase understanding of
this area. The chaotic compiler constructions are reminiscent
of Yao’s garbled circuits [12], at n bits and with recursion.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A prototype C compiler http://sf.net/p/obfusc covers ANSI C
and GNU C extensions, including statements-as-expressions
and expressions-as-statements, gotos, arrays, pointers, structs,
unions, floating point, double integer and floating point data.
TABLE II
TRACE FOR SIEVE SHOWING EXTRA BITS (RIGHT) IGNORED IN
ARITHMETIC BUT SIGNIFICANT IN MEMORY ADDRESSING. STACK READ
LINES GRAY, ADDRESS BASE RED, DISPLACEMENT VIOLET.
PC instruction trace updates | extra bits
...
22340 addi t1 sp -418452205 t1 ← -877254954|1532548040
22360 bne t0 t1 84
22384 addi t1 sp -407791003 t1 ← -866593752|1532548040
22404 lw t0 866593746(t1) t0 ← -866593745|1800719299
22424 addi t0 t0 -1668656853 t0 ← 1759716698|1081155516
22444 b 540
22988 addi t1 zer 1759716697 t1 ← 1759716697|1325372150
23008 bne t0 t1 44
...
23128 addi t0 sp -1763599776 t0 ← 2072564771|-1935092797
23148 lw t0 -2072564772(t0) t0 ← 2072564779|-1773201679
23168 addi t0 t0 1723411350 t0 ← -498991167|-981581771
23188 addi t0 t0 -1862832992 t0 ← 1933143137|-1629507929
23208 addi v0 t0 -1933143130 v0 ← 7 |1680883739
...
23272 jr ra
STOP
See Table I for Legend.
It is missing longjmp and efficient strings (char and short are
the same size as int). It is intended for use in encrypted com-
puting [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], an emerging processor
technology in which inputs, outputs, and all intermediate
values in registers and memory are in encrypted form. Because
good encryption is one-to-many, and addresses are data like
any other, many physically different bit sequences (the ‘cipher-
text’) represent the address intended by the programmer (the
‘plaintext’), and platforms exhibit hardware aliasing at every
memory access, providing a testbed for theory and practice.
A trace4 of the Ackermann function5 [19] compiled by the
compiler is shown in Table I. The Ackermann function is the
most computationally complex function possible, increasing in
the degree of complexity required to calculate it (polynomial,
exponential, super-exponential, etc.) with each increment of
the first argument. It is not practically possible to ‘cheat’ in
the calculation, and the compilation exercises the basic code
constructs (function call, conditional, arithmetic, etc.), and the
calculation is very sensitive, so it is a stiff test. The trace
illustrates how the compiler’s variation of the delta offsets for
register content through the code results in randomly generated
constants embedded in the instructions and randomly offset
runtime data – until the result is returned with offset 0.
Running a Sieve of Eratosthenes program6 for primes is a
delicate test of memory-oriented programming. The final part
of the trace is shown in Table II with two stack reads in gray
and the address base in red, with the address displacement
(in the instruction) in violet. The trace shows ‘extra bits’ that
form part of the data (and addresses) but which are not used
in the arithmetic, in order to generate hardware aliasing. The
4Initial and final content offset deltas are set to zero here, for readability.
5Ackermann C code: int A(int m,int n) { if (m == 0) return n+1; if (n
== 0) return A(m-1, 1); return A(m-1, A(m, n-1)); }.
6Sieve C code: int S(int n ) { int a[N]={[0. . . N-1]=1,}; if (n>Nn<3)
return 0; for (int i=2; i<n; ++i) { if (!a[i]) continue; for (int j= 2*i; j<n;
++j) a[j]=0; }; for (int i=n-1; i>2; --i) if (a[i]) return i; return 0; } .
extra is formed deterministically by hashing the extra bits and
visible data of the operands to each arithmetic operation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has described the compilation of imperative source
for a platform that has hardware aliasing with hidden determin-
ism. The technique depends on the compiler controlling the
address displacement and address base for load and store in-
structions so that they are always the same for repeat accesses
to the same memory location. That uses saved copies or repeats
earlier calculations exactly. The technique is extended to also
generate as well as compensate for random displacements in
the addressing, and extended again to generate and compensate
for random displacements in the data content of all registers
and memory (called chaotic compilation). A sketch proof is
included to show this technique results in object code where
it is difficult to discover the programmer’s intention at any
points of the runtime trace, while maintaining the semantics.
I.e., the compiled code is technically ‘obfuscated’.
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